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PROTECTING THE INDEPENDENCE 
OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
JUDGES: A MODEL 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
CORPS STATUTE 
Administrative law judges (ALJs) 1 preside in agency adjudica-
tory proceedings and their decisions constitute an integral part 
of state and federal policies. 2 At the federal level, each ALJ 
serves one agency, hearing cases arising under that agency alone. 
This close association of ALJs with administrative agencies may 
lead to agency proceedings that are neither objective nor well-
reasoned. Improper influence exerted by the agency, and an 
ALJ's perception that the agency evaluates his performance, de-
prive parties to agency adjudication of a fair hearing.3 In addi-
tion, the administrative process as a whole suffers due to a pub-
lic perception of bias. 4 
Congress has taken several steps to protect the independence 
of federal ALJs. Section 11 of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(APA) to some degree separates ALJs from agencies by prohibit-
ing any agency from disciplining, promoting, or demoting an 
ALJ. 11 In 1972, a federal regulation retitled hearing officers "ad-
1. An administrative law judge presides in most agency adjudicatory proceedings, 
serving a function like that of a judge. He may conduct prehearing conferences, issue 
discovery rulings, and organize the hearing. In many ways, an AW participates more 
directly in the hearing than a judge does in a case. His responsibilities, for example, 
include developing a concise record, questioning witnesses when appropriate or efficient, 
and ensuring that the claimant is treated fairly. For a detailed description of the duties 
of an ALJ, see M. RUHLEN, MANUAL FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES (1982). See also 5 
U.S.C. § 556(c) (1982). 
2. The sheer number of AWs indicates the extent of their impact. In 1980, more than 
4,000 ALJs operated at the federal and state levels. Of these, 1,119 were federal AWs, 
processing 250,000 cases in that year. Rich, Central Panels of Administrative Law 
Judges: An Introduction, 65 JUDICATURE 233 (1981). In comparison, there were 196 fed-
eral ALJs in 1947. Administrative Law Judge Corps Act: Hearings on S. 1275 Before the 
Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1983) [hereinafter cited as S. 1275 Hearings]. 
3. Abrams, Administrative Law Judge Systems: The California View, 29 Ao. L. REV. 
487, 491 (1977). 
4. Id. 
5. The APA vested most control over the ALJs in the Civil Service Commission, now 
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ministrative law judges."6 Finally, the enforcement of procedural 
rules under the AP A theoretically ensures independence for 
ALJs and a fair hearing for the parties to adjudication.7 These 
protective measures, however, are insufficient, because they have 
not achieved the goal of independence for the ALJ s. 
Eight states have enacted statutes that remove ALJs from 
their agencies and transfer them to an independent corps of 
ALJs.8 Cases assigned to the ALJs may or may not fall in their 
area of expertise and the ALJs operate through a centralized of-
fice distinct from the agencies. Enthusiasm and opposition have 
greeted similar legislation proposed at the federal level.9 The 
central corps concept in general encourages and protects the in-
dependence of ALJs, but the federal bill is inadequate in several 
ways. Rather than completely separating ALJs from subtle 
agency influence, the federal bill separates the corps into divi-
sions by specialization. In addition, a federal bill such as S. 
127510 that includes immediately all ALJs within the central 
corps may initially prove cumbersome and inoperative. In these 
respects and several others, the model statute proposed in this 
Note constitutes an improvement over the proposed federal 
· legislation. 
This Note concludes that the federal government should 
adopt some form of central panel system to protect both the in-
the Office of Personnel Management (OPM). The OPM fixes the compensation of an 
ALJ "independently of agency recommendations." 5 U.S.C. § 5372 (1982). An ALJ is 
removed or disciplined "only for good cause established and determined by the Merit 
Systems Protection Board, on the record after opportunity for hearing." 5 U.S.C. § 7521. 
In addition, the AP A gives ALJs certain responsibilities and powers that they are to 
exercise independently. 5 U.S.C. § 556(c). 
6. 5 C.F.R. § 930.203a (1984). Simply by changing the title of "hearing examiners" to 
"Administrative Law Judges," the regulation elevated the status of hearing officers. 
7. For example, an employee presiding at an adjudicatory proceeding may not "be 
responsible to or subject to the supervision or direction of an employee or agent engaged 
in the performance of investigative or prosecuting functions for an agency." 5 U.S.C. § 
554(d)(2) (1982). Additionally, the APA lays out detailed procedural requirements for 
hearings. 5 U.S.C. § 556. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (stating that 
"[t)he process of agency adjudication is currently structured so as to assure that the 
hearing . . . is on the evidence before him, free from pressures by the parties or other 
officials within the agency"); see also Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 
(1951) (holding that the findings of the hearing examiner are to be given some weight on 
judicial review of an agency decision). 
8. CAL Gov'T CODE §§ 11370, 11502 (Deering 1982); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 24-30-1001 
(1982); FLA. STAT. § 120.65 (1983); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 7, § 4H (Michie/Law. Co-op. 
1984); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 14.48 (West Supp. 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F (West Supp. 
1984-1985); TENN. CoDE ANN. § 4-5-321 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CoDE § 34.12 (1983). 
9. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. (1983). For responses to the proposed legislation, see 
S. 1275 Hearings, supra note 2. 
10. See supra note 9. 
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dependence of the ALJs and the public interest. Part I of this 
Note presents several alternatives to the central panel systems 
that have been proposed in past years and discusses their inade-
quacies. Part II summarizes the arguments concerning the cen-
tral panel system of administrative adjudication. Part III dis-
cusses several of the integral elements of a central panel system 
and analyzes the state statutes and the proposed federal legisla-
tion in light of these elements. Finally, Part IV proposes a model 
statute for an independent corps of federal ALJs. 
I. NEED FOR REFORM: ALTERNATIVES TO A CENTRAL PANEL 
SYSTEM 
ALJs preside in those agency adjudicatory proceedings that 
agencies do not choose to conduct themselves. Their responsibil-
ities include developing an accurate and complete record and 
rendering a fair and equitable decision.11 The APA created the 
position of ALJ to fill a gap resulting from the increasingly per-
vasive role of the administrative agency. Statutes authorizing 
agency action affecting property interests or individual rights re-
quire an adjudicatory proceeding. The governmental parties in-
volved in the action are biased participants and courts lack the 
time to conduct detailed proceedings in administrative adjudica-
tion.12 The position of ALJ arose from this need for an indepen-
dent adjudicator.13 
The creation of the position of ALJ met the need for a third 
party to conduct hearings and provided for some independence. 
The degree of independence, however, is incomplete, and this in-
complete independence has led to four basic problems: bias of 
ALJs, poor quality of decision making, inefficient administrative 
adjudication, and rulemaking through adjudication. Both critics 
and supporters of the present system have addressed these 
problems, and proposals for reform range from the adopted AP A 
provisions to an independent administrative court. Although 
each of these proposals possesses some advantages, many of the 
suggested solutions fail to address completely the inherent 
weaknesses of the current system. 
11. See M. RuHLEN, supra note 1, at 2. 
12. Id. at 2-3. 
13. In 1946, the APA established a corps of independent hearing officers within each 
agency. An agency can appoint as many ALJs as it needs .. 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1982). 
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A. Administrative Procedure Act Provisions 
Congress intended the prov1s10ns of the AP A that address 
ALJs to ensure the independence of ALJs by removing control 
over their status and pay from the agencies. 14 In addition, the 
APA delegation of specific powers to the ALJs delineates their 
authority and separates them somewhat from the agencies that 
employ them. 15 These AP A provisions constitute the initial step 
towards independent ALJs. Although federal agencies do not 
control ALJs under law, the APA does not in any way protect 
the decisions of ALJs from more subtle agency intluence. The 
AP A does not, for example, address the tension between an 
ALJ's role as adjudicator and his association with one particular 
agency. Nor does it preclude an agency's discriminatory depriva-
tion of vital secretarial services or comfortable surroundings. 
B. Selection Process Reform 
Currently, agencies choose ALJs -by means of selective certifi-
cation. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) maintains a 
register consisting of the names of candidates chosen by the 
OPM after an extensive interview and testing process. 16 An 
agency in need of an ALJ applies to the OPM, which certifies for 
the agency the three names on the top of its register from which 
to choose.17 Several years ago, certain agencies began to impose 
an additional experience requirement on candidates seeking po-
sitions with them because these agencies felt a need for ALJs 
with some experience.18 Often only former employees can meet 
14. See Ramspeck v. Federal Trial Examiners Conference, 345 U.S. 128, 132 (1953) 
(finding that "Congress intended to make hearing examiners 'a special class of semi-
independent subordinate hearing officers' by vesting control of their compensation, pro-
motion and tenure in the Civil Service Commission to a much g eater extent than in the 
case of other federal employees"); 5 U.S.C. §§ 5372, 7521 (1982). 
15. See 5 U.S.C. § 556(c) (1982). 
16. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 3301-3326 (1982) (establishing the selection process); see, e.g., 
§ 3313 (1982) (providing for the register of eligibles). 
17. Under the APA, "each agency shall appoint as many administrative law judges as 
are necessary for proceedings required to be conducted in accordance with sections 556 
and 577 of this title." 5 U.S.C. § 3105 (1982). These appointments must be made from 
the three highest eligible candidates as certified by the OPM. See id. §§ 3317, 3318. 
18. An agency may pass over a certified preference eligible by filing an objection to 
the candidate, accompanied by written reasons, and obtaining approval of the OPM. Id. 
§ 3318. This provision provided the loophole that led to selective certification, because 
the OPM has accepted special experience requirements as legitimate reasons for passing 
over preference eligibles. For example, the OPM will specially certify for the Federal 
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the additional requirements. 
Several commentators have suggested that Congress modify or 
abolish the selective certification process. 19 Agencies frequently 
select ALJs not on the basis of their merits, but as a result of 
agency influence. Changing the selection process would seem-
ingly correct the problem of agencies choosing former employees 
over more qualified candidates. This change would only reach 
the partiality of ALJs due to the initial hiring stage, though, be-
cause such reform does not address the permanent association of 
ALJs with agencies and the resulting partiality. 
C. Administrative Law Judge Loan Program 
Section 3344 of the APA provides that an agency that occa-
sionally or temporarily needs additional ALJs "may use admin-
istrative law judges selected by the Office of Personnel Manage-
ment from and with the consent of other agencies."20 One 
proposal for improvement of the current administrative system 
suggests increasing the use of this loan program to the extent of 
establishing a separate "loan corps."21 The primary objective of 
the program is the efficient disposition of cases. 22 An agency that 
has a greater demand for ALJs during certain peak periods may 
utilize ALJs from other agencies. In addition, an agency that has 
only occasional need for an ALJ need not keep a full-time ALJ 
on its payroll. The arguments that the loan program would pro-
vide some variety to an ALJ in the cases he hears and a fresh 
viewpoint to the agency further support the loan program. 23 
Communications Commission eligibles who can show "two years of experience in the 
preparation, presentation, or hearing of formal cases ... in the field of communications 
law." Lubbers, Federal Administrative Law Judges: A Focus on our Invisible Judiciary, 
33 Ao. L. REV. 109, 117 (1981) (quoting U.S. OFFICE OF PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT. AN-
NOUNCEMENT No. 318 (1979)). 
19. See, e.g., Lubbers, supra note 18. Lubbers states that "the objective of selective 
certification could be achieved without closing the door to highly qualified generalists by 
changing the process of ALJ certification and selection." Id. at 119. Lubbers recommends 
allowing agencies to choose from the top 10 eligibles rather than from a group selectively 
certified by the OPM. In addition, he suggests giving special consideration to applicants 
who have specific experience in an area. Id. at 127; see also H.R. 6768, 96th Cong., 2d 
Sess. (1980); S. 262, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); Aov1soRY COMMITTEE ON ADMINISTRA-
TIVE LAW JUDGES, FINAL REPORT (1978); Miller, The Tangled Path to an Administrative 
Judgeship, 25 LAB. L.J. 3, 10-11 (1974). 
20. 5 u.s.c. § 3344 (1982). 
21. See Scalia, The Hearing Examiner Loan Program, 1971 DUKE L.J. 319. 
22. REP. ATT'Y GEN. COMM. Ao. PROC. 48 (1941), quoted in Scalia, supra note 21, at 
339. 
23. Id. at 49, quoted in Scalia, supra note 21, at 340. 
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Although the loan program offers increased efficiency and va-
riety in cases heard, agencies that employ their own ALJs have 
not utilized the loan program to reduce backlogs. 24 Agencies 
would seemingly rather have their own specialized ALJs, regard-
less of the extent to which their caseloads pile up. In addition, 
an agency may feel that "borrowed" ALJs who normally preside 
over other agencies' cases are not the most qualified or inter-
ested ALJs.211 Thus, the loan program provides an inadequate 
remedy to the problems of the administrative system primarily 
because agencies do not use it. 
Even with increased use of the program, the loan program 
would not provide a complete remedy. An agency could continue / 
to assign delicate policy cases to ALJs who represent the agency 
viewpoint and use "borrowed" ALJs for those cases that the 
agency views as insignificant. Additionally, the loan program 
does not provide agency ALJs protection from agency influence, 
and, consequently, the outcomes of adjudicatory proceedings 
would still reflect this lack of independence. 
D. Administrative Courts-Article III Status 
The most complete reform proposal, aside from the central 
panel system, suggests that Congress grant ALJs Article III, ju-
dicial status.26 This proposal derives from the arguments that 
the important matters that ALJs decide require consideration 
by an Article Ill judge. ALJs should constitute an independent 
group of decision makers, separate from the administrative sys-
tem, governed by internal procedures.27 Granting ALJs Article 
III status would free them from most agency pressure because 
they would gain life tenure and guaranteed salaries.28 Although 
an administrative court system would provide advantages simi-
lar to a central panel system, an administrative court system 
would disrupt the balance of the current administrative system. 
Article III administrative courts would deny Congress flexibility 
in the funding and control of the administrative process and 
would shift the power to issue a final decision from the agency to 
24. See Scalia, supra note 21, at 321-22 (indicating that those agencies frequently 
borrowing ALJs are not the large agencies that require full-time ALJs). 
25. Id. at 344-45. 
26. See Marquardt & Wheat, Hidden Allocators: Administrative Law Judges and 
Regulatory Reform, 2 LAW & PoL'Y Q. 472, 491-92 (1980). 
27. See id. 
28. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
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the administrative court. For purposes of protecting the inde-
pendence of ALJs and improving the quality of decision making, 
such a reform of the basic structure of the administrative system 
is not appropriate or necessary. The central panel system ad-
dresses the inherent problems of the current administrative sys-
tem without eliminating the administrative system or creating 
new problems. 
II. ADVANTAGES OF AN INDEPENDENT CORPS 
An independent corps system addresses the four principal 
problems raised by a lack of ALJ independence: bias of the ALJ, 
poor quality of decision making, inefficient administrative adju-
dication, and rulemaking through adjudication. The establish-
ment of an independent corps of ALJs has alleviated these 
problems in states that have adopted a central panel system. 
The adoption of a federal corps of ALJs would similarly correct 
these problems at the federal level. 29 
A. Administrative Law Judge Bias 
Due process limitations apply to administrative adjudicatory 
proceedings as well as judicial proceedings. 30 In addition, the 
AP A "requires . . . many of the same safeguards as . . . in the 
judicial process. "31 Thus, the role of an ALJ is " 'functionally 
29. Several organizations have announced their agreement with the proposition that 
a corps system would be effective at the federal level. See S. 1275 Hearings, supra note 
2, at 4 (testimony of Edwin S. Bernstein, AL.J, U.S. Postal Service) (announcing the 
support of the Federal Administrative Law Judge Conference for the bill, and of the 
National Conference of AL.Ts for the corps concept). 
30. See, e.g., Marshall v. Jerrico, Inc., 446 U.S. 238, 250 (1980) (holding that due 
process requirements of neutrality "cannot be the same for administrative prosecutors as 
for judges, whose duty it is to make the final decision and whose impartiality serves as 
the ultimate guarantee of a fair and meaningful proceeding in our constitutional re-
gime"); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954) (stating that in the enforcement of 
policies concerning the rights of aliens, "the Executive Branch of the government must 
respect the procedural safeguards of due process"); NLRB v. Phelps, 136 F.2d 562, 563 
(5th Cir. 1943) (stating that "a fair trial by an unbiased and non-partisan trier of facts is 
of the essence of the adjudicatory process as well when the judging is done in an admin-
istrative proceeding by an administrative functionary as when it is done in a court by a 
judge"); see also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). 
31. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978); see also Wong Yang Sung v. Mc-
Grath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (stating that one of the purposes of the APA is "to curtail and 
change the practice of embodying in one person or agency the duties of prosecutor and 
judge"), modified, 339 U.S. 908 (1950). 
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comparable' to that of a judge. "32 In short, ALJs should remain 
disinterested and render nonpartisan and accurate decisions in 
administrative adjudications. 
The relationship between an agency and an ALJ makes it very 
difficult for the ALJ to fulfill these objectives. The agency influ-
ences the ALJ, both directly and indirectly, and consequently 
the ALJ's decision making reflects his bias, conscious or uncon-
scious, toward the agency. The simple association between the 
ALJ and an agency that participates in the proceeding as a 
party promotes bias on the part of the ALJ.33 ALJs associate 
with agency officials inside and outside of the office; their rela-
tionships resemble relationships among fellow employees. Dis-
cussion of cases can easily occur.34 More indirectly, ALJs will 
likely develop or adopt the agency viewpoint and approach to 
problems.311 Agencies' practice of hiring former employees as 
ALJs,36 despite the statutory requirement that they hire from 
the Civil Service Commission register,37 ensures that ALJs will 
understand and probably promote their agencies' viewpoints. 
In addition to the more subtle forms of influence mentioned 
above, agencies may directly act with the intention of improp-
32. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978). 
33. One survey demonstrates the feelings of state ALJs currently operating in central 
panel systems that a relationship between the ALJ and the agency promotes bias. In 
response to the statement that "[a] central panel ALJ whose office quarters are located 
within an agency will more likely be subject to inappropriate agency influence," 76.7% of 
the responding ALJs agreed or strongly agreed. M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, THE CENTRAL 
PANEL SYSTEM FOR ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGES: A SURVEY OF SEVEN STATES 62 (1983); 
see also 2 R. POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 442-43 (1959). 
34. For example, in Brown v. United States, 377 F. Supp. 530 (N.D. Tex. 1974), an 
investigator for the Federal Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs was discharged 
following a hearing. The court held that the investigator was denied due process because 
the hearing examiner and the prosecutor had discussed the case prior to the hearing. 
35. See, e.g., Pfeiffer, Hearing Cases Before Several Agencies-Odyssey of an Ad-
ministrative Law Judge, 27 AD. L. REV. 217, 221 (1975). Pfeiffer, an ALJ who has experi-
ence serving before eight different agencies, states that "exposure to the same field of 
regulation inevitably results in the development of a point of view which, unconsciously 
or otherwise, influences the initial decision and, in some cases, the conduct of the hear-
ing." Id. at 221. See also S. 1275 Hearings, supra note 2, at 155-56 (testimony of John T. 
Miller, Attorney and Adjunct Professor, Georgetown University Law Center). 
36. In 1975, of the 13 ALJs assigned to the FTC, 12 were former employees. Nothing 
indicates a change in the current situation. Segal, The Administrative Law Judge: 
Thirty Years of Progress and the Road Ahead, 62 AB.A. J. 1424, 1426 (1976). Similarly, 
over 65 percent of NLRB ALJs are former employees, and over 50% of ICC ALJs were 
employees at the time of their appointment. Davis, Judicialization of Administrative 
Law: The Trial-Type Hearing and the Changing Status of the Hearing Officer, 1977 
DuKE L.J. 389, 403. In 1978, 55% of ALJs responding to a questionnaire were members 
of an agency immediately before they became ALJs. U.S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL. ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW PROCESS: BETTER MANAGEMENT IS NEEDED 68 (1978). 
37. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text. 
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erly influencing the outcome of adjudicatory proceedings. These 
actions range from denying secretarial assistance38 to "counsel-
ling" ALJs who grant more than the average number of appeals 
by claimants. 39 One claimant even alleged that an "improper 
and illegal contractual arrangement [made by an agency] with a 
sitting ALJ" denied his employer a fair resolution of the corpo-
ration's case:'0 
The appearance of bias also damages the administrative sys-
tem:41 The association of an ALJ with one particular agency for 
a period of years certainly gives the appearance of unity of pur-
pose and thought. "2 When the ALJ has come from within the 
ranks of the agency, the appearance of bias is especially strong. 
In addition to the general public's perception, the perception of 
the parties and attorneys involved in a proceeding is of great 
importance to the legitimacy of the administrative system. 
When parties to adjudication believe that the judge is impartial, 
38. S. 1275 Hearings, supra note 2, at 343 (testimony of Kenneth F. Glover, ALl, 
Department of Health and Human Services). 
39. Id. at 33-34 (statement of Victor W. Palmer, ALl, Department of Agriculture). 
Judge Palmer describes the "feedback" system of the Social Security Administration, by 
which the agency reviews decisions of ALJs "who had granted more than the 'average' 
number of appeals by claimants." In addition, the statement of Kenneth Glover contains 
a detailed description of the treatment he received as a "targeted ALl" in the Social 
Security Administration. Id. at 344 (statement of Kenneth F. Glover, ALl, Department 
of Health and Human Services); see also Nash v. Califano, 613 F.2d IO (2d Cir. 1980) 
(addressing a complaint of interference with judicial independence at the Social Security 
Administration). 
40. In a hearing before the House of Representatives, the Vice President of Kellogg 
Co. discussed Kellogg's experiences during an ·adjudicatory proceeding before the FTC. 
Hearings on H.R. 6768 Before the House Post Office and Civil Service Comm., 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1980) [hereinafter cited as H.R. 6768 Hearings] (testimony of Chris-
topher McNaughton, Sr. Vice President, Corporate Services and General Counsel, Kel-
logg Co.). 
41. Senator Howell Heflin, in introducing S. °I275 to the Subcommittee on Adminis-
trative Practice and Procedure, stressed that the public perception of the administrative 
system is a major concern. "[T]he perception of an independent adjudication is para-
mount for confidence in our administrative system." S. 1275 Hearings, supra note 2, at 2 
(statement of Senator Howell Heflin); see also id. at 89 (statement of Duane R. Harves, 
Chief Hearing Examiner for the Minnesota Office of Administrative Hearings). 
42. An often quoted statement by Bernard Segal,· an ex-president of the American 
Bar Association, expresses the concern with the appearance of bias: 
Consider . . . the unavoidable appearance of bias when an administrative law 
judge, attached to an agency, is presiding in litigation by that agency against a 
private party .... [S]o long as that judge has offices in the same building as 
the agency staff, so long as the seal of that agency adorns the bench on which 
that judge sits, so long as that judge's assignment to the case is by the very 
agency whose actions or contentions that judge is being called on to review, it is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for that judge to convey the image of being 
an impartial fact finder. 
Segal, supra note 36, at 1426. 
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they will probably present their case more carefully and 
completely. 43 
The establishment of an independent corps of ALJs would vir-
tually eliminate actual bias and the perception of bias by remov-
ing ALJs from the influence of the agency.44 Reforms that fail to 
separate ALJs from administrative agencies do not eliminate the 
threat of bias. 411 
B. Quality of Decision Making 
The quality of adjudicatory decision making in the present 
administrative system suffers from the long association of each 
ALJ with one agency. Adjudicators hearing the same type of 
cases for any length of time may rely on their own preconcep-
tions of a problem to decide a case.46 Although opponents of the 
central panel system argue that the administrative process de-
pends on the expertise that an ALJ brings into the adjudicatory 
process,47 better reasoned decisions result when an ALJ hears a 
variety of cases. When confronted with varied types of cases, an 
ALJ must base his decisions on knowledge derived from the 
hearing and the expertise of others.48 The ALJ might also con-
sider creative arguments more often under a central panel sys-
tem. Although this may not always be beneficial, it may often be 
the creative arguments of parties to the adjudication that bring 
about important changes in the law. 
Hearing a variety of cases will stimulate an ALJ intellectually 
as well as sustain well-reasoned decision making.49 An ALJ with 
43. See Pfeiffer, supra note 35, at 230; see also Zwerdling, Reflections on the Role of 
an Administrative Law Judge, 25 Ao. L. REv. 9 (1973) (elaborating on the impact of 
perceived bias on the parties). 
44. See, e.g., S. 1275 Hearings, supra note 2, at 5 (testimony of Judge Victor W. 
Palmer, ALJ, Department of Agriculture); Rosenblum, The Central Panel System: En-
hancing Administrative Justice, 65 JUDICATURE 235 (1981). 
45. See H.R. 6768 Hearings, supra note 40, at 32 (testimony of Christopher Mc-
Naughton, alleging that the threat to the independence of ALJs inheres in the structure 
of the present system). 
46. See Davis, supra note 36, at 402 (quoting United States v. United Shoe Mach. 
Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295, 346 (D. Mass. 1953), a/f'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 521 (1954)); 
Kestin, Reform of the Administrative Process, N.J. LAW., Summer 1980, at 35, 36. 
47. See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text. 
48. See S. 1275 Hearings, supra note 2, at 23 (testimony of Judge Victor W. Palmer 
arguing that the knowledge of the ALJ is "supposed to consist of what happens in the 
hearing"). 
49. See Pfeiffer, supra note 35, at 217; Miller, The Vice of Selective Certification in 
the Appointment of Hearing Examiners, 20 Ao. L. REV. 477 (1968). In addition, Justice 
Rehnquist once commented that "a judiciary overburdened with work will respond more 
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experience hearing cases in eight different agencies once de-
clared that, for these reasons, "no more than five years should 
be spent with any one agency. "60 Furthermore, diversity in cases 
heard probably would attract more qualified applicants to the 
position of ALJ. Qualified people otherwise might not consider a 
position that involves hearing routine cases on a daily basis.1n 
In addition to the effect on an ALJ of hearing different types 
of cases, an ALJ's perception of his role will affect his perform-
ance. 62 He may take more pride in his decisions and complete 
his job more thoroughly if he feels he has independence. Deci-
sions made by ALJs in a central panel system, therefore, proba-
bly reflect more careful attention than those made by agency 
ALJs. Moreover, this feeling of independence provides another 
reason for more qualified applicants to consider the position of 
ALJ.63 
C. Efficiency in Administrative Adjudication 
In theory, the central panel system of ALJs provides an im-
portant improvement over the present system of agency ALJs in 
terms of efficiency. 64 In the present administrative system, each 
agency has a separate docketing system, separate staff and 
ALJs, and separate equipment necessary for administrative ad-
judication. A central panel system centralizes the supply of such 
equipment and resources and consequently may increase effi-
ciency through economies of scale. 66 A central panel system 
' 
affirmatively to the need for putting in long hours if a large portion of the work is ·profes-
sionally challenging." What the Justices are Saying, 62 A.B.A. J. 1454, 1456 (1976) 
(presenting excerpts from a speech given by Supreme Court Justice Rehnquist at the 
A.B.A. Annual Meeting, Section of Labor Relations Law). 
50. Pfeiffer, supra note 35, at 225. 
51. See What the Justices are Saying, supra note 49, at 1456; see also S. 1275 Hear-
ings, supra note 2, at 97 (testimony of Herbert E. Forrest, President, Federal Communi-
cations Bar Association). 
52. See Rosenblum, The Central Panel System: Enhancing Administrative Justice, 
65 JUDICATURE 235 (1981); Scalia, supra note 21, at 344. 
53. See Rosenblum, supra note 52, at 235; Levinson, The Central Panel System: A 
Framework that Separates ALJs from Administrative Agencies, 65 JUDICATURE 236, 243 
(1981). 
54. The central panel system in Colorado was established with very little resistance 
for precisely this reason. Supporters sold the legislation on the basis of the system's fiscal 
impact; the legislature considered it a means of increasing efficiency in the administra-
tive process. See M. RICH & W. BRUCAR. supra note 33, at 20. 
55. One example of this centralization involves the fully computerized systems of 
docket management of the Department of Labor and the NLRB. These systems have 
capabilities sufficient to service an entire corps of ALJs. The docket schedules of all 
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would also allow for greater flexibility in the assignment of 
ALJs, in turn leading to greater efficiency.56 Certain agencies 
have a heavy workload and thus use full-time ALJs. Other agen-
cies, however, have no need for full-time ALJs and, in fact, use 
ALJs only periodically.57 Under the central panel system, ALJs 
hear cases as they arise, and those agencies that do not require 
the services of ALJs continuously do not need to keep them on 
their payroll. 
Evidence from two states using a central panel system sup-
ports the proposition that an independent corps of ALJs in-
creases cost efficiency in state systems. In Minnesota, decreases 
have occurred in the cost of administrative hearings,58 the num-
ber of hearing examiners,59 the time required to issue a deci-
sion,60 and the backlog of cases.61 The evidence from New Jersey 
indicates a similar decrease in the costs of processing an admin-
istrative hearing62 and in the number of ALJs necessary, despite 
agency adjudicatory proceedings could be maintained on one computer system, reducing 
the costs that each agency now spends on its individual docket system. S. 1275 Hearings, 
supra note 2, at 6. In addition, under a corps system, it would be unnecessary for each 
agency to provide the secretarial and court reporter services or other equipment upon 
which an ALJ relies. Instead, one organization would provide such services for all ALJs. 
56. See id. 
57. For example, the Social Security Administration hires nearly 800 ALJs and uses 
most full-time. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, on the other hand, does not 
have any full-time ALJs. 
58. The amount budgeted to pay for hearings in the Minnesota Public Service Com-
mission has decreased considerably over the past six years, despite continuous inflation. 
In 1976, the Commission had an annual budget of $400,000; the 1977 budget was 
$311,330; the 1978 budget was $234,000; and by 1982, the annual budget had decreased 
to $184,219. In the Minnesota Department of Commerce, the budget decreased from 
$120,000 to $60,000 over the same period. Duane Harves; the Chief Hearing Examiner in 
Minnesota, estimates that agencies have saved in excess of 50% in terms of hearing 
costs. S. 1275 Hearings, supra note 2, at 10, 13 (testimony of Duane R. Harves). 
59. Despite the increased number of agency proceedings, the number of examiners 
necessary to carry the workload in Minnesota decreased by 27 percent between 1976 and 
1982. This indicates greater productivity on the part of ALJs. Id. at 9-10. 
60. In general, the average time required for issuing a decision has been reduced to 
20 days. Id. at 10. Particularly in the case of worker compensation proceedings, which 
the legislature recently transferred to the central panel system, the decrease in the time 
required has been substantial. In December 1981, the average time for issuing a decision 
was 101 days. In May 1983, this time was 46 days; in 60% of the cases, the average time 
was 30 days. Id. at 11. 
61. When the Minnesota state legislature created the Office of Administrative Hear-
ings in 1975, Minnesota ALJs had a backlog of 15 cases per judge, including some cases 
that were two years old. By the end of May, 1983, the backlog was only four cases per 
judge, with a total of only 26 cases over 60 days old. Harves claims that by July 1, 1983, 
all judges in the system would be current and no cases would be older than 60 days. Id. 
at 11. 
62. In 1980, the average cost of processing an administrative hearing in New Jersey 
was $540, compared to $508 in 1982. S. 1275 Hearings, supra note 2, at 76 (statement of 
Howard H. Kestin). 
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an increasing number of cases.63 The argument that the central 
panel system leads to delay and extra costs due to agencies' de-
sire to review more decisions lacks support.64 Like federal agen-
cies, central panel state agencies accept the majority, sometimes 
up to ninety-five percent, of the decisions made by their ALJs.66 
Although use of the central panel system leads to increased 
efficiency in state systems, a central panel system may not nec-
essarily result in increased efficiency in the federal system. The 
efficiencies may differ in a central panel system encompassing all 
federal ALJs because of the enormous size of the federal admin-
istrative system.66 Thus, the model statute proposed in this Note 
provides for a trial corps excluding selected ALJs.67 
D. Check on Agencies' Rulemaking Through Adjudication 
A leading complaint about the present administrative system 
is that agencies have adopted rules without following established 
procedures. Instead, agencies frequently set policy through ad-
ministrative adjudication, using the adjudicatory process as a 
tool. The courts have criticized this practice,68 and others have 
called it "rule-making by fiat."69 Florida, Massachusetts, and 
Minnesota have enacted statutes establishing central panel sys-
tems partly out of displeasure with this agency practice.7° Cen-
63. Overall, the productivity of the average ALI in New Jersey has increased. In 
1979, 130 ALJs heard 6,000 cases; in 1982, only 45 ALJs heard 12,000 cases. Each ALI 
heard 145 cases in 1980, 203 cases in 1981, and 226 cases in 1982. Id. at 76. 
64. See Lubbers, A Unified Corps of ALJs: A Proposal to Test the Idea at the Fed-
eral Level, 65 JUDICATURE 266, 275 (1981). 
65. M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note 33, at 69. This statistic also appears to rebut 
the suggestion that review is more cursory under the corps system. The acceptance of 
Al.J's decisions indicates that the agencies feel satisfied with the decisions. 
66. The federal system is obviously much larger and it may be more difficult to trans-
fer all federal ALJs and federal adjudicatory proceedings to a central corps. See S. 1275 
Hearings, supra note 2, at 183-84 (statement of Joseph B. Kennedy, ALI, Federal Mine 
Safety and Health Review Commission, arguing that the experiences of the state systems 
are irrelevant in terms of the federal system). 
67. See infra MODEL STATUTE §§ 2, 3. 
68. See Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199 (1974)(stating that the APA encourages rule-
making through established procedures); SEC v. Chenery Corp, 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947) 
(stating that "[t]he function of filling in the interstices ... should be performed, as 
much as possible, through this quasi-legislative promulgation of rules ... "); Bell Aero-
space Co. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973) (holding that the NLRB could not re-
verse itself through adjudication, but must follow established procedures for rulemak-
ing), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 416 U.S. 267 (1974). 
69. Rich, Adapting the Central Panel System: A Study of Seven States, 65 JUDICA-
TURE 246, 249 (1981) (interview with the Chief Hearing Examiner in Minnesota). 
70. Id. at 249. 
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tralized pools of ALJs provide a check on such agency behavior 
because an agency cannot rely on an independent ALJ to inter-
pret and establish vague rules in favor of the agency. 
III. ELEMENTS OF A CENTRAL PANEL SYSTEM: STATE STATUTES 
AND PROPOSED FEDERAL LEGISLATION 
In order to develop a model central panel system that ad-
dresses the problems inherent in the current federal system, one 
must consider attempts to resolve some of the same problems in 
state systems.71 Eight states have enacted legislation establish-
ing central panels, of ALJs, and each statute differs in approach. 
The provisions addressed with the most variation involve the ju-
risdiction of the corps and the relevance of expertise to the as-
signment of cases. These issues, along with the questions of the 
role of the director and the proper weight of ALJ decisions, con-
stitute the principal issues in any discussion of an independent 
corps of ALJs. The provisions of the eight state statutes con-
cerning those issues, considered together with the previously 
proposed federal bill, S. 1275, provide a necessary backdrop for 
the study and development of an independent corps of ALJs at 
the federal level. 
A. Jurisdiction 
An analysis of the jurisdiction of a central corps of ALJs must 
address two basic issues: which agencies the statute covers, and 
whether agencies' use of the corps is mandatory. 
1. Covered agencies- State systems vary substantially re-
garding which agencies the statute covers. In California, the 
statute requires only those agencies specifically enumerated in 
the statute to use the central pool of ALJs.72 In contrast to this 
71. A comparison between the state and federal systems indicates that the states face 
some of the same problems facing the federal system. The eight states that have estab-
lished central panel systems have addressed issues of independence and efficiency and 
have attempted to resolve the related problems. Victor Rosenblum, in his testimony 
before the Subcommittee on Administrative Practices and Procedure, suggested that the 
record of the California central panel system indicates the feasibility of the system. S. 
1275 Hearings, supra note 2, at 196 (testimony of Victor Rosenblum, Professor of Law, 
Northwestern University). But cf. id. at 183 (statement of Joseph B. Kennedy, ALJ, 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission) (arguing that the experiences of 
the state systems are irrelevant in terms of the federal system). 
72. CAL Gov'T ConE §§ 11500(a), 11501 (Deering 1982). Originally, the California 
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method, several states provide for blanket coverage, specifying 
the exceptions to the coverage in the statute.73 In addition, two 
states have created systems in which only a few agencies must 
use the central panel, and any other agencies may elect to do 
so.74 Unlike any state statute, the recently proposed federal leg-
islation would establish a corps consisting of "all current 
ALJs."76 
Because state administrative systems are smaller in scale than 
the federal system, a central panel of ALJs that provides ser-
vices to all state agencies operates more feasibly than the same 
type of system on the federal level. The problems of organizing 
and coordinating over 1,100 ALJs and proceedings from twenty-
eight agencies could be overwhelming initially. Instead of at-
tempting to transfer all current federal ALJs to a central corps, 
statute required only licensing agencies to use the central panel ALls. All other agencies 
had the choice of using their own ALJs or the panel. The number of agencies required to 
use the panel has increased continually, so that 70 agencies now use the central panel 
services. 
73. In these jurisdictions, each state agency must typically use the panel ALls unless 
the state APA excepts it from the statute's coverage. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 24-30-1003 
(1982); FLA. STAT. § 120.57(1)(a) (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.03 (West Supp. 1984); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-8 (West Supp. 1984-1985); WASH. REV. CoDE § 34.12.020(4) (1983). 
This type of provision gives the state legislature the option of excepting agencies that the 
legislature believes would not benefit from the panel system. For example, in New 
Jersey, the exceptions to panel coverage are: the State Board of Parole, the Public Em-
ployees' Regulatory Commission, the Division of-Workers' Compensation, and the Divi-
sion of Tax Appeals. The Senate reasoned that "[t]his exclusion is based on the grounds 
that these agencies are specialized entities devoted solely to hearings in highly special-
ized areas." NEW JERSEY SENATE, STATE GOVERNMENT, FEDERAL AND INTERSTATE RELA-
TIONS AND VETERANS AFFAIRS COMM., STATEMENT, reprinted at N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-1 
(West Supp. 1984-1985). 
On the other hand, the exclusion of certain agencies from coverage may simply result 
from political power struggles. The original legislation in Minnesota excluded jurisdic-
tion over unemployment compensation and worker compensation claims, and the Bureau 
of Mediation Services. The chief hearing examiner in Minnesota states that these excep-
tions were appropriate because they were not really proceedings that presented contested 
cases. Harves, Making Administrative Proceedings More Efficient and Effective: How 
the ALJ Central Panel System Works in Minnesota, 65 JUDICATURE 257,265 (1981). But 
cf. Rich, supra note 69, at 248. Rich argues that the Minnesota legislature passed the bill 
without including these claims and agencies in its coverage because organized labor pre-
vented their inclusion. 
74. In Tennessee, those agencies authorized to employ their own ALJs use the corps, 
and other agencies may elect to do so. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-5-301(d), 4-5-301(e) (Supp. 
1984). The Tennessee method provides for the basic needs of an administrative system 
that does not appoint separate ALJs to each agency. 
The Massachusetts approach follows that of Tennessee. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 7, § 44 
(Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 1984). Originally, only the Massachusetts Civil Service Com-
mission and 12 other state agencies could use the services of the corps. This has since 
been changed, allowing other agencies to apply for service. Id. § 414. 
75. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 562(a) (1983). The federal system would, there-
fore, encompass ALJs from 28 separate agencies and departments. 
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the model statute proposed in this Note provides for a trial 
corps. The model statute operates similarly to the state statutes 
that cover all agencies except those specifically exempted. This 
express exclusion method allows Congress to choose a combina-
tion of agencies that presents a manageable group and represen-
tative problems that the statute addresses.76 Under the model 
statute, the trial corps would operate for a period of several 
years to allow full evaluation of the independent corps system. 77 
2. Mandatory or voluntary use- In the course of developing 
a central panel system, a legislature must determine whether use 
of the system will be mandatory or voluntary. The argument in 
favor of agencies' voluntary use of central panel ALJs asserts 
that a smoother transition to the central panel system will occur. 
If legislation does not require agencies to submit cases to the 
corps, agencies may offer less resistance to the change.78 Addi-
tionally, evidence exists that, under a voluntary use panel sys-
tem, agencies will make increasing use of the corps, until eventu-
ally all agencies will use the corps. 79 
The federal bill, along with several state statutes, allows the 
agencies to hear cases themselves if they so choose.80 A central 
76. The idea of a trial corps that would serve most of _the smaller agencies has been 
previously proposed. See Lubbers, supra note 64, at 275; S. 1275 Hearings, supra note 2, 
at 111. It is argued that the smaller agencies should be included in a trial corps because 
the size of the corps could be controlled. Lubbers would exclude the three largest agen-
cies: the Social Security Administration, the National Labor Relations Board, and the 
Labor Department. See Lubbers, supra note 64, at 275. But cf. S. 1275 Hearings, supra 
note 2, at 138 (testimony of Joseph A. Morris, General Counsel, U.S. Office of Personnel 
Management, stating that the smaller agencies are the agencies doing the most regula-
tory and rate work, making them the agencies most in need of expertise). Lubbers would 
also exclude the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission and the Federal 
Mine Safety Health Review Commission, because "they are already functioning as sepa-
rate trial courts." Finally, under Lubbers's proposal, the corps would not include the 
economic regulatory agencies "since they must first adjust to the affects of the deregula-
tion movement." Lubbers, supra note 64, at 275. 
A trial corps should include a mix of both small and large agencies, in order to test the 
opportunity for flexibility in the assignment of cases. Moreover, to be an effective test of 
the corps concept, it should involve different types of agencies doing different types of 
work. The proposed model corps statute specifies the excluded agencies in section 3. 
77. The proposed model corps statute establishes a trial corps that would remain in 
effect for six years. This would allow the corps to operate through two administrations, 
sufficient time to test the concept. At the end of six years, all federal ALJs would join 
the corps and agencies could not maintain separate ALJs without specific congressional 
authorization. 
78. See M. R1cH & W. BaucAR, supra note 33, at 40. 
79. Id. at 40 (interview with Chief Administrative Magistrate, Division of Adminis-
trative Law Appeals, Massachusetts). The Director of the Massachusetts program con-
tends that, on average, one agency a month decides to use the central panel for the first 
time. 
80. Under the previously considered federal bill, "the agency, or one or more mem-
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panel system in which agencies elect whether they will use the 
panel, however, may prove ineffective in terms of providing a 
check on the agencies. An agency may hear sensitive cases itself, 
and use panel ALJs for cases the agency finds unimportant.81 
Moreover, "panel" ALJs may feel the need to compete with 
"agency" ALJs, once again threatening the independence of 
ALJs.82 
Mandatory use is necessary to prevent selective use by the 
agencies and to protect the independence of ALJs. It seems un-
likely that agencies will choose to use the corps for every case 
that requires an ALJ. The model statute proposed in this Note, 
therefore, makes use of the ALJ corps mandatory,83 and requires 
covered agencies to use the corps for adjudicatory proceedings. 
Furthermore, to ensure a pure trial of the corps concept, the 
model statute limits use of corps ALJs to the covered agencies. 
B. Role of the Director 
A discussion of the role of the director or chief ALJ in a cen-
tral panel system must address two separate issues: the method 
of selection of the Chief ALJ, and the duties of the Chief ALJ. 
1. Method of selection- The various state central panel sys-
tems employ a fairly uniform method to select their Chief ALJs. 
A political body or an elected official outside the administrative 
agencies appoints the Chief ALJ. In most states, the governor 
makes the appointment and the state senate confirms the ap-
pointment. 84 Similarly, the federal bill would provide for the ap-
pointment of the Chief ALJ by the President, with consent of 
hers of the body that comprises the agency, may hear the case and render the decision 
thereon." S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 568(c) (1983); see also WASH. REV. CODE § 
34.12.040 (1983); CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 11512(a) (Deering 1982) (providing that the agency 
will determine if an ALJ will preside alone or with an agency member). 
81. See Levinson, supra note 53, at 244 (stating that "[t]he overall impact of the 
central panel system of course depends upon the extent to which use of central panel 
ALJs is mandatory"); see also S. 1275 Hearings, supra note 2, at 20 (testimony of Judge 
Victor W. Palmer). 
82. See Abrams, Administrative Law Judge Systems: The California View, 29 Ao. L. 
REV. 487, 495 (1977). 
83. See infra MODEL STATUTE § 3(b). 
84. See, e.g., CAL Gov'T CODE § 11370.2(b)(Deering 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.65(1) 
(West Supp. 1984-1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.48 (West Supp. 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 
52:14F-3 (West Supp. 1984-1985); WASH. REV. CODE § 34.12.010 (1983). Massachusetts 
and Tennessee, however, each require that the secretary of the department housing the 
ALJs appoint the director. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 7, § 4H (Michie/Law. Co-op. Supp. 
1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-221 (1979). 
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the Senate. 85 
The appointment of the Chief ALJ by the President is an ap-
propriate method for filling the position; the Chief ALJ fills a 
position analogous to an agency head. A strong argument exists, 
however, that because the Chief ALJ's decisions and actions will 
significantly impact the effectiveness of the central panel sys-
tem, 86 a supposedly independent organization, the political ap-
pointment of the Chief ALJ is inappropriate. 
The proposed model statute incorporates the procedure uti-
lized by most states and provides for the President to appoint 
the Chief ALJ.87 Nonetheless, the model statute addresses the 
above concern and ensures a degree of separation from the polit-
ical process by fixing a six-year term for the Chief ALJ. Under 
the proposed statute, the term of the Chief ALJ does not corre-
spond with that of the President.88 
To ensure that the selection process operates thoroughly, the 
federal bill would establish a "Judicial Nomination Commis-
sion," which would submit to the President the names of quali-
fied nominees for Chief ALJ.89 This process differs from that of 
the states. State central panel statutes do not provide for nomi-
nation committees, but generally leave the entire selection pro-
cess to the designated elected official. The proposed model stat-
ute establishes a nominating committee because use of the 
committee should promote the selection of a qualified Chief ALJ 
85. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 563(a) (1983). 
86. The insights of the director of a central panel system may lead to reform or ad-
justment of the system, because the director's position affords him a good overview of 
the system. One commentator praises the work of state central panel directors. "Direc-
tors in the central panel states appear to have made effective use of their overviews by 
adopting and modifying procedural rules for the ALJs and by submitting law reform 
proposals to appropriate public officials." Levinson, supra note 53, at 243. 
87. See infra MODEL STATUTE § 4(a). 
88. The term for the first director should be six years, the same number of years 
determined to be appropriate for the length of the trial corps system. See supra note 77. 
Minnesota and New Jersey both fix the term of office for the director at six years, 
longer than the term of the appointor. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 14.48 (West Supp. 1984); N.J. 
STAT. ANN.§ 52:14F-3 (West Supp. 1984-1985). Under S. 1275, the chief ALJ would serve 
a term of five years or until a successor is appointed. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 
563(a) (1983). 
The majority of states leave the duration of the term to the discretion of the ap-
pointer. For example, in California, Florida, Massachusetts, and Tennessee, no statutory 
provision establishes the term of the director. In Colorado, the director has Civil Service 
status and can be removed only "for cause." 
89. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 566 (1983). Under this previously proposed bill, 
the Nomination Commission would also submit names for division chief ALJ, a position 
not established under the proposed model statute. The President may reject the list and 
request a second list. Id. § 566(e)(5). 
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respected by his peers. 90 The composition of the committee, 
however, should be more diverse than that required in S. 1275.91 
The proposed model statute provides that chief judges of federal 
courts of appeals, on a rotating basis, select part of the nominat-
ing committee to ensure a variety of views. Additionally, the 
proposed statute fills three of the positions on the committee 
with persons involved in the day-to-day problems of ALJs.92 
2. Duties- The duties of the Chief ALJ vary only slightly 
throughout the eight state systems. The Chief ALJ generally ap-
points the ALJs and the staff of the corps.93 Most importantly, 
the responsibility of assigning cases to ALJs lies with the Chief 
ALJ.94 The proposed federal legislation delegates only the duty 
of reporting to the President and Congress regarding the busi-
ness and personnel needs of the corps.911 All other responsibili-
ties lie with the Council of the corps, the main policy-making 
body of the corps. 96 
The model statute proposed in this Note limits the extensive 
authority that the Council possesses under S. 1275. It provides 
that the Chief ALJ is responsible for the initial appointment of 
individuals to the position of ALJ and the assignment of cases to 
90. See infra MoDEL STATUTE § 9. 
91. Under S. 1275, the Commission would consist of five members selected by speci-
fied parties. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 566(b) (1983). 
92. This provision is consistent with S. 1275. Id. § 566(b). The proposed model stat-
ute provides that each of the following three persons will appoint a member to the Nom-
ination Commission: the Chairman of the Administrative Conference of the United 
States, the Chairman of the Administrative Law Section of the American Bar Associa-
tion, and the President of the Federal Administrative Law Judges Conference. 
93. CAL. Gov'T CoDE § 11370.3 (Deering 1982); CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 24-30-1003 (1973); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.65 (West Supp. 1984); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.48 (West Supp. 1984); 
WASH. REV. CODE § 34.12.020 (1983). But see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-4 (West Supp. 
1984-1985). In New Jersey, the governor appoints the ALJs. 
94. CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11370.3 (Deering 1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.65(5) (West 
1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.50 (West Supp. 1984); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-5 (West 
Supp. 1984-1985); WASH. REv. CODE § 34.12.040 (1983). 
A statute may delegate additional duties to the director as well. The director is often 
specifically required to promulgate uniform rules of procedure, and to review and report 
on the operations of the system. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.51 (West Supp. 1984); N.J. 
STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-5 (West Supp. 1984-1985); WASH. REv. CODE § 34.12.080 (1983). 
95. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 563(c) (1983). 
96. Id. § 565(d)(9). S. 1275 would delegate the responsibility for "all ... matters of 
general policy" to the Council of the corps. These matters include, but are not limited to, 
appointment of ALJs, approval of the establishment of regional offices, and promulga-
tion of rules and regulations. 
The Council would consist of the Chief ALJ and the division chief ALJs. Because the 
proposed model statute does not establish divisions, the position of division chief ALJ 
does not exist. The Council instead consists of the chief ALJ and several ALJs elected by 
the entire corps. See infra MODEL STATUTE § 8 . 
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ALJs.97 Assuming a responsible Chief ALJ, an individual can 
perform these duties more efficiently than a group of ALJs. The 
model statute delegates general policy decisions to the Council, 
as does S. 1275.98 
C. Expertise 
The method of assigning cases to ALJs represents a crucial 
issue in developing a central panel system. Additionally, a long-
standing question in debates over the role of the ALJ centers on 
the degree of expertise in one substantive area that ALJs must 
possess. Thus, central panel systems vary a great deal with re-
spect to whether the Chief ALJ takes expertise into considera-
tion in the assignment of cases. Each state provision concerning 
the consideration of expertise in assignment of cases reflects a 
philosophy about the function of an ALJ. 
Opponents of the corps. concept contend that an ALJ must 
have expertise in a particular area in order to make a proper 
decision in an adjudicatory proceeding. They argue that admin-
istrative proceedings focus on complex issues that lie "outside 
the area of [general] judicial competence."99 Unless ALJs spe-
cialize in one administrative area, therefore, they cannot render 
intelligent decisions in agency proceedings. Moreover, they ar-
gue, a lack of knowledge will lead to inefficiency. An ALJ who 
has heard cases in a particular area for a single agency for sev-
eral years will dispose of a case more efficiently than an ALJ 
who lacks knowledge in the subject.100 
97. See infra MODEL STATUTE § 4. 
98. See infra MODEL STATUTE § 8; S. 1275, ·98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 565(d)(9) (1983). 
99. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT 16 (3d ed. 1972). Davis addresses the argu-
ment that agency adjudication is best done by the agency rather than by a court. The 
arguments for agency adjudication in this situation are analogous to the arguments of 
the proponents of specialization. Davis suggests that: 
Courts are not qualified to fix rates or to determine what practices related to 
rates are to be preferred . . . . Judges rather obviously cannot furnish the skills 
in law, accounting, and engineering supplied by the staff of a relatively simple 
agency like the FCC, to say nothing of a more complex agency like the Depart-
ment of Health, Education and Welfare. 
Id. at 14; see also S. 1275 Hearings, supra note 2, at 295 (statement of C.M. Butler III, 
Chairman, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission). This statement contains a descrip-
tion of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's experiences in hiring ALJs. Butler 
argues that the time necessary for training an ALJ in the FERC area is substantial and 
that this is true even when the ALJs were hired from related agencies. Butler concludes 
that "the work of the major economic regulatory agencies is not so similar as to permit 
easy movement from one area to another." Id. at 295: 
100. "[T]he specialized unit may dispose of hundreds of cases a week, whereas it 
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In addition to the argument that an ALJ must specialize in 
order to render a competent decision, opponents of the corps 
concept claim that Congress created the position of ALJ to en-
able agencies to generate policy through adjudication.101 An 
ALJ, therefore, must consider the effect of a particular outcome 
on the relevant substantive area of administrative law.102 Spe-
cialization leading to expertise is critical according to this argu-
ment, because only a knowledgeable ALJ can render a decision 
regarding a particular set of facts that furthers the goals and 
policies of the agency. These advocates of specialization believe 
that the need for expertise outweighs the need to protect the 
independence of the ALJs. 103 
Notwithstanding these arguments expounded by opponents of 
the corps concept, specialization is unnecessary. An ALJ does 
not need to specialize in one area, but should instead be an ex-
pert "in the hearing of cases, in determining ultimate facts and 
interpreting and applying the law."10' A person qualified in 
these respects will properly conduct a proceeding and capably 
make an intelligent decision in a specialized area.10~ Because the 
establishment of a central panel system will create interest in 
might take a judge a week for a handful of ... cases." K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
TEXT 16 (2d ed. 1959). 
101. One commentator contends that 
[g]ranting adjudicative powers to agencies was viewed as a device to more fully 
arm them to effectively pursue legislative programs in concert with other agency 
powers, including the rule-making and organizational powers also vested in them 
by Congress. The power to settle disputes between governmental and private 
concerns is viewed as one means of implementing a program by shaping and 
applying agency policy consistent with legislative intent in concrete 
circumstances. 
Pops, The Judicialization of Federal Administrative Law Judges: Implications for Poli-
cymaking, 81 W. VA. L. REV. 169, 174 (1979). 
102. See id. at 179 (stating that the "views of an ALJ must be broader than just one 
case"). 
103. But cf. Davis, supra note 36, at 401 (arguing that the concern for objectivity and 
independence was the primary reason for the creation of the position of ALJ) (citing 
SENATE COMM. ON ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE IN GOVERN-
MENT AGENCIES, S. Doc. No. 8, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 45-50 (1941)). 
104. Coan, Operational Aspects of a Central Hearing Examiners Pool: California's 
Experiences, 3 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 86, 88 (1975) (supporting assignment on a rotating 
basis); see also Kestin, supra note 46. 
105. See S. 1275 Hearings, supra note 2, at 159 (testimony of John T. Miller). Miller 
argues that expertise is only a pretense, and that any qualified ALJ can quickly develop 
a working knowledge of an area. For example, one of the most eminent ALJs at the 
Federal Power Commission had only two years of telephone law experience that was of 
no use to him. He encountered, however, no difficulties developing an "expertise." In 
addition, the performance of federal district court judges supports the proposition that 
adjudicators can judge well without substantive expertise. 
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the ALJ position on the part of qualified people, 106 a system in 
which ALJs receive assignments on a rotating basis should pro-
duce well-reasoned and unbiased outcomes.107 Moreover, Judge 
Victor Palmer suggests that any previous need for experienced 
ALJs may decline as the result of a significant change in the 
flavor of cases that ALJs hear; increasingly, ALJs hear more en-
forcement proceedings and benefits cases, and less regulatory 
proceedings.108 Evidence of this trend further supports the argu-
ments for ALJs with general knowledge. 
Not only is specialization of ALJs unnecessary, it is counter-
productive as well.109 An ALJ who hears the same type of cases 
on a daily basis will frequently rely on his preconceptions of the 
issues in rendering his decision. An unconscious bias will affect 
his decisions and he will not thoroughly consider these decisions. 
Moreover, repetition of the same type of cases provides no intel-
lectual challenge to specialized ALJs. Better quality decision 
making results from a system that enables ALJs to hear a vari-
ety of cases. 110 
Specialization of ALJs proves counterproductive in several 
other ways. First, a panel consisting of ALJ s experienced in 
many different areas is more efficient due to the flexibility in 
assignment.111 An ALJ will always remain available to preside in 
a hearing, regardless of which agency requires the ALJ. Also, ro-
tation of assignments encourages agencies to promulgate more 
specific rules because they know that an independent ALJ is not 
well-versed in their policies.112 
106. See Pfeiffer, supra note 35, at 225. 
107. See S. 1275 Hearings, supra note 2, at 152 (testimony of John T. Miller). 
108. S. 1275 Hearings, supra note 2, at 7 (testimony of Judge Victor W. Palmer). 
Judge Palmer states that only seven percent of the ALJs currently serving are now hear-
ing rulemaking cases, as opposed to 60% at the time of the enactment of the APA. The 
bulk of the cases over which ALJs now preside do not involve the type of complexities 
that some regulatory cases involve. See also Lubbers, supra note 64, at 269. 
109. See supra text accompanying notes 46-53. 
110. See id. 
111. For evidence of cost savings due to state central panel systems, see supra notes 
58-63 and accompanying text. A specific example of a state's cost savings is realized 
when an ALJ traveling to out-of-town proceedings can handle several different kinds of 
cases because the central panel director need only arrange for one trip. See S. 1275 
Hearings, supra note 2, at 87 (statement of Duane R. Harves). In addition, the common 
arguments address the possibility that the large agencies will use extra ALJs during peak 
periods. 
112. If agencies' policies are to be promoted, then they must be well-articulated. 
More potential exists for circumventing a vague rule rather than a well-written rule. In 
addition, clearly stated rules require an agency to accomplish its rulemaking through the 
established procedures. An independent ALJ will not provide a mechanism through 
which the agency can do its rulemaking. See supra text accompanying notes 68-70. 
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State statutes differ in their approach to the problem of spe-
cialization. In several states, the relevant legislation requires the 
chief ALJ or director to take expertise into account when as-
signing cases. This requirement may result in the assignment of 
an ALJ to an agency on a long-term basis,113 the establishment 
of general areas of specialization within the corps, 114 or simply 
the exercise of discretion by the Chief ALJ. 115 The pending fed-
eral legislation would similarly require the Council to assign 
cases by expertise by dividing the corps into several divisions of 
expertise. 116 
The remaining states utilizing central panel systems make no 
provision for expertise and allow discretion in the assignment of 
cases. 117 In general, a Chief ALJ may attempt to assign ALJs 
with some knowledge in an area when he feels that a particularly 
complex case requires expertise. But especially in these states 
that do not require assignment by expertise, the Chief ALJs at-
tempt to train the ALJs in a variety of areas. 118 
The model statute proposed in this Note does not establish 
113. In the state of Washington, the director assigns each ALJ to an agency on a 
long-term basis. The responsibility of the ALJ is then primarily to that agency. WASH. 
REv. CooE § 34.12.040 (1983). This approach bears the most resemblance to the current 
federal approach. 
114. In Minnesota, the legislative mandate has led to the establishment of three areas 
of specialization: utilities and transportation, environment, and licensing and enforce-
ment. Supervisory examiners in each area assign cases to ALJs. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.50 
(West Supp. 1984). 
115. Florida and New Jersey each require that the director consider expertise when 
assigning cases. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(l)(b)(3) (West 1978); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:14F-6 
(West Supp. 1984-1985). The director exercises discretion in choosing an ALJ to assign 
to a case. The practice in Florida is to assign each ALJ a wide variety of cases when 
possible. See M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note 33, at 50 (interview with Florida 
Director). 
116. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. §§ 564(a), 564(b) (1983). The initial divisions would 
be: Division of Communications, Public Utility, and Transportation Regulation; Division 
of Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation; Division of Labor; Division of Labor 
Relations; Division of Benefits Programs; Division of Securities, Commodities, and Trade 
Regulation; Division of General Programs and Grants. The number of divisions could 
range from four to ten, and the Council would later establish this number and the juris-
diction of each division. The bill would then assign ALJs to divisions according to their 
current specialization. 
117. These states are California, Colorado, Massachusetts, and Tennessee. 
118. The director of the system in Colorado states: 
If a hearing officer does one kind of case for a long period of time, he will have a 
tendency to stop listening. Moving the hearing officers around brings freshness 
to the system. Lawyers complain that they have to train the judges on the law, 
but this is what lawyers should do. 
M. RICH & W. BRUCAR, supra note 33, at 50 (interview with Colorado Director). Simi-
larly, the Massachusetts Director assigns ALJs considering experience only if a case is 
particularly complex. "[O]therwise, the hearing officers are broken into all types of hear-
ings and are rotated regularly." Id. at 50 (interview with Massachusetts Director). 
560 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 18:2 
divisions within the corps as Minnesota has done,119 and as S. 
1275 recommends.120 Assigning ALJs to divisions is inconsistent 
with one of the main goals of the corps system: to separate the 
ALJs from their agencies and promote the independence of 
ALJs. The regular association of ALJs with certain agencies 
would begin anew the process of indoctrinating agency view-
points. Conceding that a special case might demand expertise 
due to its complexity, the proposed model statute allows the 
Chief ALJ to assign a knowledgeable ALJ when he deems it ap-
propriate.121 In most cases, however, a qualified ALJ from the 
corps will assuredly render a competent decision. 
D. Weight of ALJ Decision 
Decisions by ALJs in state central panel systems constitute 
recommended or initial decisions reviewable by the agency.122 
This practice is consistent with the standard of review estab-
lished by the AP A and the majority of state AP As. The federal 
bill would similarly provide final decision-making power to the 
agency.128 Contrary to these provisions, one commentator sug-
gests that an ALJ's decision operate as a final order to ensure 
that the agency cannot circumvent the corps system.124 This step 
is unnecessary, however, for two reasons. First, the current stan-
dard of review does not threaten the independence of the ALJs, 
so no need exists to modify it. Second, the authority of an ALJ 
is substantial. Although ALJs simply recommend decisions, 
agencies generally accept these recommendations. 12& Moreover, 
an ALJ has the opportunity to characterize witnesses and to 
draft findings of fact, 126 and a reviewing court will attach some 
weight to the ALJ decision as a portion of the entire record on 
119. See supra note 114. 
120. See S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 564 (1983). 
121. The Chief ALJ must use this discretion subject to the disapproval of the Council 
should the Council find an abuse of discretion. See infra MODEL STATUTE § 6. This provi-
sion limits the discretion of the Chief ALJ without continually interfering with his 
duties. 
122. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 11517 (Deering Supp. 1984); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 24-4-
105(14) (1982); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 120.57(1)(b) (West 1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 14.61 
(West Supp. 1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-5-314 (Supp. 1984); WASH. REV. CODE § 
34.12.060 (1983). 
123. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 568(c) (1983). 
124. See Levinson, supra note 53, at 237. 
125. In central panel states, agencies accept recommended decisions in the majority 
of cases and up to 95% of the time. See M. R1cH & W. BRUCAR, supra note 33, at 69. 
126. See Abrams, supra note 82, at 498-99. 
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judicial review. 127 In several states, the decision of an ALJ is 
presumptively correct and an agency can set aside only those de-
cisions not supported by substantial evidence. 128 The model 
corps statute operates on the theory that, in reality, the ALJ's 
decision bears great weight. Accordingly, the model statute pro-
vides for agency review. 129 
IV. MODEL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE CORPS STATUTE 
The present administrative system in which agencies have the 
opportunity to influence ALJs leads to bias on the part of ALJs 
and to a lack of quality decision making. These inherent 
problems deprive parties to agency adjudication of a fair hear-
ing, and the administrative process as a whole suffers. Eight 
states have taken steps to alleviate the problems resulting from 
this system and have enacted legislation that establishes an in-
dependent corps of ALJs. The corps system protects the inde-
pendence of ALJs, improves the quality of their decision mak-
ing, and increases efficiency of administrative adjudication. The 
adoption of the following proposed model corps statute would 
constitute a positive step towards reform of the federal adminis-
trative system. 
A. Operation of the Model Statute-An Overview 
The proposed model statute establishes a corps of ALJs that 
operates independently of the federal administrative agencies. 
The model statute transfers to the Corps all current ALJs ex-
cept those expressly exempted. The statute transfers those ALJs 
that will present a representative and manageable trial corps. 
127. See Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951) (holding that some 
weight must be accorded the decision of the AW). Courts have not been certain how 
much weight should be attached to an AW's decision. As a result, courts have measured 
the undefined weight differently according to the facts of each individual case. For cases 
in which a reviewing court reversed an agency decision overturning an AW decision, see 
Cinderella Career & Finishing Schools v. FTC, 425 F.2d 583 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Retail 
Store Employees Union v. NLRB, 360 F.2d 494 (D.C. Cir. 1965). Cf. American Fed'n of 
Television & Radio Artists v. NLRB, 395 F.2d 622 (D.C. Cir. 1968), Lorain Journal Co. v. 
FCC, 351 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 967 (1966). 
128. In Colorado and Florida, the decision of an AW is presumptively conect. In 
Massachusetts, the practice indicates "a strong presumption in favor of the AW's find-
ings on review." See Levinson, supra note 53, at 242. 
129. See infra MoDEL STATUTE § 7. 
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Federal administrative agencies will refer to the Corps all ad-
ministrative proceedings conducted under sections 554 and 556 
of the Administrative Procedure Act. 
A nomination committee nominates and the President ap-
points the Chief ALJ of the Corps. The Chief ALJ appoints all 
ALJ s and assigns cases to ALJ s as he receives referrals from the 
administrative agencies. The Chief ALJ alone has the responsi-
bility for assigning cases, although he must attempt to rotate as-
signments as much as possible. The Chief ALJ shall not take 
expertise into account in the assignment of cases, unless he be-
lieves that a fair resolution of a case so requires. He may use his 
discretion in those circumstances, subject to disapproval by the 
Council if it finds that the Chief ALJ has abused his discretion. 
The Council of the Corps constitutes the main policy-making 
body of the Corps. 
STATEMENT OF PURPOSE AND POLICY 
This legislation seeks to protect the independence of 
Administrative Law Judges by removing them from 
administrative agencies and transferring them to an 
independent corps; to improve the quality of adminis-
trative adjudicatory decision making; to increase effi-
ciency in the administrative system; and to promote 
the fair and unbiased resolution of agency adjudica-
tory proceedings. This legislation establishes a Corps 
of Administrative Law Judges distinct and separate 
from the federal administrative agencies. The Corps of 
Administrative Law Judges will conduct certain fed-
eral proceedings and issue decisions concerning those 
proceedings according to the provisions of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act. 
SECTION 1: DEFINITIONS 
For purposes of this Act, unless the context 
otherwise requires: 
(a) "Administrative Law Judge" means a 
person appointed under Title 5 United 
States Code Section 3105 to preside in 
agency adjudicatory proceedings; 
(b) "Agency" means an authority referred 
to in Title 5 United States Code Sec-
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tion 551(1) and not exempted in sec-
tion 3 of this Act; 
(c) "Corps" means the Administrative 
Law Judge Corps of the United States 
established under section 2 of this 
Act; 
(d) "Chief Judge" means the Chief Admin-
istrative Law Judge appointed and 
serving under section 4 of this Act; 
(e) "Council" means the Council of the Ad-
ministrative Law Judge Corps estab-
lished under section 8 of this Act; 
(f) "Nomination Commission" means the 
Judicial Nomination Commission for 
the Administrative Law Judge Corps 
established under section 9 of this 
Act; and 
(g) "Board" means the Complaint Resolu-
tion Board established under section 
10 of this Act. 
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SECTION 2: ESTABLISHMENT AND MEMBERSHIP 
(a) This Act establishes an Administra-
tive Law Judge Corps that consists of 
all Administrative Law Judges cur-
rently serving any federal agency not 
exempted in section 3(a) of this Act. 
The Corps will sit at the seat of Gov-
ernment and will remain in eff'ect until 
six years from the eff'ective date of 
this Act. After six years from the ef-
fective date of this Act, the exemp-
tions granted in section 3(a) of this 
Act shall cease and the Corps shall 
consist of all Administrative Law 
Judges. 
(b) This Act transfers Administrative 
Law Judges, serving as such on the 
date of the commencement of opera-
tion of the Corps, to the Corps as of 
that commencement date. 
(c) An Administrative Law Judge ap-
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pointed on or after the date of the 
commencement of the operation of the 
Corps to any agency not exempted in 
section 3 will be a member of the 
Corps as of the date of appointment. 
Comment 
This section provides that the Corps covers all current agen-
cies except those enumerated in Section 3. Instead of attempting 
to transfer all current federal ALJs to a corps, this provision al-
lows Congress to choose an appropriate combination of agencies 
for the trial of the corps system. Initially, the Chief Judge and 
Council can more efficiently and easily administer a trial corps 
than an all-encompassing corps. 
Moreover, .by requiring Congress to exclude expressly particu-
lar agencies from coverage, this statute ensures that Congress 
will consider the merits of each exclusion. Congress will not mis-
takenly exclude any agency from the Corps, and no questions 
can arise as to which agencies it meant to include. 
SECTION 3: JURISDICTION 
(a) The following agencies are exempt 
from the provisions of this Act: 
Federal Labor Relations Authority; 
Federal Mine Safety and Health Re-
view Commission; 
Merit Systems Protection Board; 
Occupational Safety and Health Re-
view Commission; 
Social Security Administration; 
United States Coast Guard; and 
United States Postal Service. 
(b) An Administrative Law Judge who is 
a member of the Corps will conduct all 
hearings of agencies required to be 
conducted in accordance with Title 5 
United States Code Section 554 or 
556. 
(c) A federal court or an agency may re-
fer to the Corps any case, other than 
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the cases that are referred to the 
Corps under subsection (b), if the 
court or agency determines that the 
fair resolution of the case requires a 
determination on the record after an 
opportunity for a hearing. 
Comment 
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This section excludes seven federal agencies from the coverage 
of the Corps. The Social Security Administration utilizes too 
many ALJs to be included initially in the trial corps. After elim-
inating it from coverage, the size of the trial corps decreases by 
almost 700 ALJs, making the trial corps more manageable. The 
Corps does not include the Occupational Safety and Health Re-
view Commission or the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review 
Commission because they operate essentially as independent re-
view agencies. The Merit Systems Protection Board hears com-
plaints against ALJs and thus cannot be included in the Corps. 
A conflict of interest would result if a corps ALJ presided in a 
MSPB proceeding regarding the conduct of another corps ALJ. 
Section 3 excludes the Federal Labor Relations Authority be-
cause several other labor-oriented agencies are included and pro-
vide sufficient representation of this area of administrative law 
for the trial corps. The statute excludes the United States Postal 
Service because it operates very independently of the federal 
government. Finally, the statute excludes the Coast Guard be-
cause the Coast Guard must remain in a state of military readi-
ness and operates in essence as a branch of the Armed Services. 
An ALJ from the Corps must conduct all adjudicatory hear-
ings of all non-exempt agencies. Mandatory use of the system 
ensures that agencies will not elect to hear sensitive cases 
themselves. 
SECTION 4: CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE 
(a) The Chief Administrative Law Judge 
is the principal administrative officer 
and the presiding judge of the Corps. 
The Chief Judge is nominated in ac-
cordance with section 9 of this Act 
and the President appoints the Chief 
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Judge with the advice and consent of 
the Senate. 
(b) The Chief Judge must have served as 
an Administrative Law Judge for at 
least five years before the date of ap-
pointment as Chief Judge. 
(c) The Chief Judge will serve the 
greater of a term of 6 years or until 
the President appoints a successor 
and the successor qualifies to serve. If 
nominated for reappointment in ac-
cordance with section 9 of this Act, 
the President may reappoint a Chief 
Judge with the advice and consent of 
the Senate. 
(d) If the office of Chief Judge becomes 
vacant, the Council will elect one of its 
members with at least five yea:rs of 
experience as an Administrative Law 
Judge to serve as acting Chief Judge 
until the position is filled in accor-
dance with section 9 of this Act. If no 
member of the Council has at least 
five years of experience as an Admin-
istrative Law Judge, the Council will 
elect one of its members regardless of 
prior experience. Any Administrative 
Law Judge appointed to serve as 
Chief Judge for an unexpired term 
shall serve only for such unexpired 
term but may be reappointed in accor-
dance with section 9 of this Act. 
(e) The duties of the Chief Judge consist 
of: 
(i) appointing and maintaining a 
staff of Administrative Law 
Judges; 
(ii) assigning Administrative Law 
Judges to administrative pro-
ceedings according to section 6 
of this Act; and 
(iii) reporting in writing to the Pres-
ident and the Judiciary Commit-
tees of the Congress concerning 
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the operations of the Corps, the 
future personnel requirements 
of the Corps, and the possibility 
of amending section 3 of this Act 
to include exempted agencies in 
the Corps. 
Comment 
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The Chief Administrative Law Judge must have served as an 
ALJ for at least five years before the date of appointment. The 
importance of the position and the Chief Judge's control over 
the operation of the Corps mandate a significant experience re-
quirement. For the same reasons, this provision separates the 
Chief Judge from the political process to some extent. A term of 
six years ensures that the Chief Judge serves without accounting 
directly to the President under whom he begins his term. 
The Chief Judge appoints all ALJs and assigns all cases to the 
ALJs. One individual can fulfill these responsibilities better and 
more efficiently than a group of ALJs; the Council need not dis-
cuss and vote on these issues. 
SECTION 5: APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW JUDGES 
The Chief Judge will appoint additional Administrative 
Law Judges to the Corps when the Council deems addi-
tional appointments necessary for the operation of the 
Corps. The Chief Judge will make appointments from 
the register maintained by the Office of Personnel 
Management under Title 5 United States Code Section 
3313. In accordance with Title 5 United States Code 
Section 3317, the Office of Personnel Management will 
certify three names from the top of the register for 
each position to be filled. 
Comment 
The selection of ALJs will continue in accordance with Title 5 
United States Code Chapter 33. Chapter 33 provides for the 
OPM register and for certification of eligible applicants from 
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this register. In contrast to the previously proposed federal bill, 
however, the Chief Judge rather than the Council appoints ALJs 
from the register. 130 
SECTION 6: ASSIGNMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW JUDGES 
The Chief Judge will assign an Administrative Law 
Judge for any proceeding within the jurisdiction of the 
Corps. The Chief Judge will not consider whether an 
Administrative Law Judge previously served as an 
Administrative Law Judge before or as an employee of 
a particular agency in the assignment of proceedings. 
The Chief Judge will make assignments in a way that 
best contributes to the training of each Administrative 
Law Judge in a variety of administrative and regula-
tory matters. Notwithstanding the requirement that 
the Chief Judge not consider an Administrative Law 
Judge's experience in proceedings before or prior em-
ployment with a particular agency in the assignment 
of cases, the Chief Judge may assign an Administra-
tive Law Judge to a particular case according to prior 
experience when the Chief Judge deems previous 
knowledge necessary to a fair resolution of the pro-
ceeding. The Chief Judge exercises this authority sub-
ject to disapproval by the Council should the Council 
find an abuse of discretion. 
Comment 
Under this provision, the Chief Judge will generally not take 
into account the expertise of a particular ALJ in the assignment 
of cases. Additionally, this section forbids the division of the 
Corps into areas of specialization. The Chief Judge must rotate 
assignments to the extent necessary to train ALJs in a variety of 
areas. This section seeks to establish a corps of ALJs with a 
broad range of experience. 
The Chief Judge may assign proceedings to ALJs with special 
knowledge or experience when he feels that a particular case re-
130. Under the federal bill, the Council would appoint a person to the position of 
ALJ. S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 567(a) (1983). 
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quires expertise. The Chief ALJ makes this decision subject to 
the Council's disapproval. If the Council finds an abuse of the 
Chief Judge's discretion, it may disapprove the assignment of an 
"experienced" ALJ. 
SECTION 7: DECISIONS OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW JUDGES 
An Administrative Law Judge will render an initial de-
cision in any proceeding in accordance with Title 5 
United States Code Sections 554 and 556, which will 
become a final order unless reviewed by the agency in 
accordance with Title 5 United States Code Section 
557(b). The initial decision will contain findings of fact 
and may contain conclusions of law. 
Comment 
The ALJ renders an initial decision, subject to agency review. 
This provision is consistent with the current federal system; Ti-
tle 5 United States Code Section 557 accords the same weight to 
the decisions of ALJs as does this statute. 
SECTION 8: COUNCIL OF THE CORPS 
(a) The Council of the Corps constitutes 
the policy-making body of the Corps. 
The Council will consist of seven Ad-
ministrative Law Judges elected by 
the members of the Corps to serve a 
term of three years. The Council will 
meet once a month or as necessary. 
This section requires a majority vote 
of the Council members present for 
Council approval. 
(b) The duties of the Council consist of: 
(i) prescribing the rules of practice 
and procedure for the conduct of 
proceedings before the Corps, 
except that these rules must be 
in accordance with the Adminis-
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trative Procedure Act and any 
other agency procedures in ef-
fect before the effective date of 
this Act; 
(ii) approving or disapproving the 
filing of charges seeking ad-
verse action against an Adminis-
trative Law Judge under section 
10 of this Act; 
(iii) approving or disapproving the 
establishment or abolition of re-
gional offices of the Corps and 
the assignment of personnel 
thereto; 
(iv) disapproving the assignment of 
a proceeding to an Administra-
tive Law Judge with previous 
experience in the area of the 
proceeding, if the Council finds 
an abuse of discretion by the 
Chief Judge; 
(v) issuing rules and regulations as 
may be appropriate for the effi-
cient conduct of the business of 
the Corps; 
(vi) establishing and maintaining 
such other offices as are neces-
sary to carry out the functions, 
powers and duties of the Corps; 
(vii) fixing the compensation of Corps 
employees other than Adminis-
trative Law Judges, subject to 
Civil Service and classification 
laws and regulations; 
(viii) delegating any of the Chief 
Judge's powers to other employ-
ees during the continued ab-
sence from service of the Chief 
Judge;and 
(ix) making arrangements for con-
tinuing judicial education and 
training of Administrative Law 
Judges. 
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Comment 
This section establishes the Council of the Administrative 
Law Judge Corps as the main policy-making body of the Corps. 
While the Act delegates decisions regarding appointment and 
assignment of ALJs to the Chief Judge, the Council decides all 
other general policy matters. In addition, the Council may disap-
prove the assignment of a case to an ALJ if it finds the Chief 
Judge abused his discretion. This provision limits the Chief 
Judge's control over the assignment of cases. The Council con-
sists of seven members, a number sufficient to facilitate discus-
sion of policy issues. 
SECTION 9: JUDICIAL NOMINATION 
COMMISSION 
(a) This Act establishes a Judicial Nomi-
nation Commission for the Corps. The 
Nomination Commission will consist 
of seven members selected as pro-
vided in subsection (b) of this section 
and will submit the names of qualified 
nominees for appointment to the posi-
tion of Chief Judge. 
(b) Each of the following persons shall 
choose one person as member to the 
Nomination Commission: 
(1) The Chief Judge of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia Circuit; 
(2) The Chief Judge of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the 
1st Circuit; 
(3) The Chief Judge of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the 
2nd Circuit; 
(4) The Chief Judge of the United 
States Court of Appeals for the 
3rd Circuit; 
(5) The Chairman of the Adminis-
trative Conference of the United 
States; 
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(6) The Chairman of the Adminis-
trative Law Section of the 
American Bar Association; and 
(7) The Chairman of the Federal 
Administrative Law Judges 
Conference. 
The opportunity to appoint one mem-
ber to the Nomination Commission 
will rotate in numerical order through 
the United States Courts of Appeals 
after the initial appointments. 
(c) The persons first appointed pursuant 
to paragraphs 1 and 2 of subsection 
(b) will serve for a term of three 
years; the persons first appointed pur-
suant to paragraphs 3, 4, and 5 of sub-
section (b) will serve a term of two 
years; and the persons first appointed 
pursuant to paragraphs 6 and 7 of 
subsection (b) will serve a term of one 
year. Each person appointed after the 
initial appointments will serve a term 
of three years. 
(d) The Nomination Commission will sub-
mit to the President the names of 
three persons qualified to fill the posi-
tion of Chief Judge of the Corps. The 
President will appoint a Chief Judge 
from the list of three persons provided 
by the Nomination Commission. The 
President may, however, reject any 
list and request that the Commission 
submit another list, except that the 
President may not request more than 
two additional lists. 
Comment 
This provision establishes a Judicial Nomination Commission 
similar to that proposed in S. 1275.131 The requirement that the 
President appoint the Chief Judge from a list provided by the 
131. See S. 1275, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 566 (1983). 
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Nomination Commission ensures that the peers of the Chief 
Judge respect him and consider him qualified for the position. 
Unlike the previously proposed federal legislation, the Nomi-
nation Commission consists of members chosen by four circuit 
court judges and three members involved in the day-to-day ac-
tivities of administrative law judges. This combination of indi-
viduals should present a wide variety of views and ideas. The 
rotation of the opportunity to appoint a member among the cir-
cuit courts will also encourage a variety of views and opinions. 
I 
SECTION 10: DISCIPLINE OF ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW JUDGES 
(a) The Council will establish a Com-
plaints Resolution Board to consider 
and recommend appropriate action 
upon complaints against the official 
conduct of Administrative Law 
Judges. The Complaints Resolution 
Board will consist of nine members, 
elected by the Corps for a term of two 
years. The Complaints Resolution 
Board will issue a report to the Coun-
cil after a hearing concerning the mis-
conduct of an Administrative Law 
Judge. The Complaints Resolution 
Board will recommend that the Coun-
cil file a notice of adverse action with 
the Merit Systems Protection Board if 
the Complaints Resolution Board finds 
just cause for removing or disciplining 
an Administrative Law Judge. 
(b) The Council may take action against 
an Administrative Law Judge only af-
ter the Council has filed a notice of ad-
verse action against the Administra-
tive Law Judge with the Merit 
Systems Protection Board. Action in-
cludes removal, suspension, repri-
mand and discipline. 
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This provision does not change the established approach to 
discipline or removal of ALJs. The OPM may remove an ALJ 
only for good cause, as determined by the Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board. This provision further establishes an internal proce-
dure within the Corps held prior to a Merit Systems Protection 
Board hearing. The Council will refer complaints filed with it to 
the Complaints Resolution Board, which will recommend appro-
priate action. Although this section does not prevent the MSPB 
from proceeding with disciplinary actions, the procedure estab-
lished gives the Corps the opportunity to take care of problems 
before the Council refers complaints to the Merit Systems Pro-
tection Board. 
-Karen Y. Kauper 
